The Transnationalization of Agricultural Production: Palimpsest of the Transnational State

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This paper explores theoretically the emergence of the transnational State. Based on the historical experience of the emergence of the state at the national level fulfilling four major functions — accumulation, legitimation, mediation of inter- and intra-class conflict — and social reproduction, and utilizing empirical research in an agricultural commodity, frozen concentrated orange juice, the paper argues that the increased significance of transnational corporations requires the emergence of a state apparatus beyond the level of the nation. The paper suggests ways and means of looking for such an emergence.

Introduction

This paper develops an exploratory way of looking at and for the State. Drawn largely from an empirical analysis of an agricultural commodity, this paper undertakes an exploratory safari into the terra incognita of the transnational State. Although this paper originates in an empirical study of a mundane agricultural commodity, frozen concentrated orange juice, it will not deal with empirical matters but will focus on theoretical and logical issues that are derivative from the empirical study.

First, I will review the levels of analysis currently utilized in the examination of agricultural policy: national and the international. This is necessary to create the environment for a juxtaposition relating to the transnational State. Second, while the analysis emerges from an empirical study of an agricultural commodity, it will be concerned with preliminary theoretical formulations about the transnational State.

Levels of Analysis in State Policy on Agriculture

Two and a half levels of analysis regarding State policy and agriculture have emerged in recent decades.

First and foremost, the national levels of policy with respect to agriculture have long been established and institutionalized. These have varied widely in Western Europe and the United
States and have centered on a number of considerations including the political base and importance of the agricultural population; maintenance of a national capacity to sustain population by maintaining food security or as sources of external earnings; and ideological beliefs about the role of agriculture as a population-holding or retrieval system, i.e., a labor reserve.

Whatever the reasons, and they are often complex, most nations have established agricultural policies since these relate to food policies. Food policy is a major consideration for a nation once a significant segment of its population no longer sustains itself directly from the land. This has been the case in all the advanced capitalist societies of Western Europe.

The second level of analysis relating to agriculture and food policy emerged after the second World War. While the importance of food as an instrument of national policy had been primitively understood before, it was not until the second World War that a new level of understanding emerged with respect to food.

Focused on such popular formulations as world hunger, there developed clearer conceptions of food as an instrument of national policy in the international arena. Whereas food had been thought of largely before in terms of trade, there emerged a conception of food as a political instrument. The organizational manifestation of this conception was focused initially in the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) but later was shared with a complex of organizations including the World Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the regional development banks, and the World Food Conference.

While these international organizations have provided important loci for meetings and debates, these have been, almost entirely, venues in which national interests and concerns are brought to bear. Some regional interests—particularly north-south, developed-developing, first world-fourth/fifth world splits—have crystallized at this international level but policies continue to reflect to a considerable degree, national interests manifested through national representation.

The half-level to which reference was made applies to the European Community (EC) which has made agricultural policies a major focus of activity. The EC represents a curious intermediate level that conjoins national levels and policies with a new level of political economy reflective of super-national and regional interests of nation-states with very uneven levels of agricultural development.

As can be expected, data sources, information, and analysis about each of the two and a half levels reflect the historic importance of each. Thus, data and analysis at the national level is most detailed, with ministries of agriculture producing all sorts of information about agricultural production and the movement of agricultural products. Production and trade, in other words, are key processes which nation-states address. Information at the international level is more abstract, being focused less on production, which is seen as being a national jurisdiction, and more on exchange.

**Following Frozen Orange Juice**

The lacunae in the organization of data sources and the basis for the theoretical considerations that are the focus of this paper have developed from a study of an agricultural commodity, oranges. Having been involved for a number of years in the analysis of the social organization of agricultural commodity production systems, including processing tomatoes, iceberg lettuce, fresh grapes, raisins, and wine, additional research in citrus has generated involvement in a very different form of analysis (Friedland and Barton 1975, 1976; Friedland, Barton, and Thomas 1981; Friedland 1984; Friedland forthcoming).

This is because all of the previous items studied represent commodities primarily in
national production, processing, and distribution with only wine being important in international trade. Citrus, in contrast, particularly in the form of frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ), while produced, processed, and distributed nationally, represents a commodity whose overall system—production, processing, and distribution—has become transnational.

Although having national origins, the emergence of a transnational system, in contrast to a simply international one, is what is of interest. This is because FCOJ is now being produced in a variety of different national locations but its successive forms of transformation and distribution have moved significantly beyond the national level.

Research in citrus as a commodity system has revealed:

1. FCOJ technology, having emerged during the 1940s, resolved the problem of Florida’s chronic overproduction of oranges by creating a transformed, i.e., processed, product.

2. After several decades of expanding and developing a national market, the United States began to export FCOJ to high-income countries in Northern Europe.

3. In 1960, Coca-Cola emerged as a major factor in FCOJ production through its purchase of Minute Maid (a processing firm), including orange groves and processing plants in Florida. Although Coca-Cola is big—probably the largest single firm in FCOJ production—the FCOJ system is characterized by oligopoly rather than monopoly.

4. With a sizable market for FCOJ in the U.S. but with the vagaries of weather affecting production, Brazil came “on line” during the 1960s as a major producer of oranges with processing capacity because of occasional freezes that upset the supply of FCOJ (Wilson 1980).

5. Brazilian production began with an initial focus on the U.S. market but, during the 1970s, opened or penetrated other markets.

In particular, the Canadian market, which had been dominated by U.S. production, became increasingly “brazilianized.” This same process also began in Northern Europe.

6. Coca-Cola became an important organization involved in growing, processing, and distribution. Coke’s role outside the U.S. was more involved with “downstream” rather than “upstream” activities, i.e., processing, reprocessing, distribution, and marketing, rather than growing (except in Florida).

7. Methodologically, excellent data sources exist at the national level with respect to production of citrus, imports and exports, but not about ownership of production facilities or market shares.

It is this last finding, as well as research in other agricultural commodities and in non-agriculture, that has stimulated interest in the issue of the transnational State, the subject of this paper. The citrus case exemplifies the new transnational production and distribution systems built around new corporate forms of organization, the transnational corporation (TNC).

Unlike Coca-Cola in its more “normal” multinational form in which production and distribution facilities are maintained within discrete national boundaries even though ownership is fundamentally national (i.e., Coca-Cola being registered under national laws of the U.S., Lebanon, or Lichtenstein, etc.), in this new transnational form, the various stages of production, processing, and distribution are owned and controlled differentially and the TNC may shift different aspects of the three basic activities to maximize its economic performance.

Thus, Coca-Cola grows, processes and distributes FCOJ in the U.S. but reprocesses and distributes in Canada. It apparently does not grow in Brazil. It may process there, however, but distribution locally is not in FCOJ form. Since most Brazilian FCOJ is exported, Coke is undoubtedly an important factor in importation into the U.S. (although one whose magnitude is, at least at present, unclear). But Coke did not
import Brazilian FCOJ into the U.S. for reprocessing in Florida, since that State's standards for the levels of sugar (degrees brix) required in FCOJ were, until 1980, higher than the federal standard. Thus, Coca-Cola could take advantage of differential Florida-U.S. standards by importing Brazilian FCOJ outside of Florida and reprocessing it with Florida FCOJ (for taste and quality reasons) for U.S./Canadian markets. Or, Coke could export U.S. FCOJ from Florida and import, through a Canadian subsidiary, Brazilian FCOJ into Canada for reprocessing and distribution.

How Coca-Cola brings its juice into the European market is still unclear. It may no longer be importing U.S. juice since the Brazilian product is cheaper. In EC countries, it could import FCOJ via Israel, an importer of the Brazilian product, for mixture with Israeli juice and re-export to the EC with which Israel bears a special relationship and therefore has some tariff advantages. The point is, however, that Coca-Cola maintains differential capacity in different locations and is therefore capable of maximizing its advantages in growing, processing, re-processing, and marketing. With respect to FCOJ alone, let alone its other products, Coca-Cola has become a truly transnational corporation.

**Considering the Transnational State Theoretically**

The approach taken in this paper is frankly exploratory. Essentially it is concerned with (1) an exploration of the character of an emergent social form, the transnational State; and (2) a consideration of agricultural policy as the venue within which the transnational State emerges.

Readers will probably raise questions immediately. What is the character of the State? How can there be a transnational State when the political forms of such a formation do not appear to exist? And finally, why utilize agriculture as the functional location to explore such a complex problem; why not use industry, or trade?

The last question can be answered most easily. There is one important reason for utilizing agriculture to explore the transnational State: agriculture and agricultural policies at the national level constitute a basic set of concerns for all national societies and states; unless there is a constant flow of food in abundance and relatively cheaply to the urbanized and industrialized populations of the advanced capitalist countries, domestic unrest will increase. Thus, agricultural policy is fundamentally concerned with food policies and these concerns are ubiquitous.

The first question raised on the character of the State is difficult to deal with since philosophers and scholars have been debating the character of the State ever since Hegel. This paper will not review or define the State as it will be developed in this paper.

First, I take the State, following Marx, to represent the interests of any ruling group, i.e., any set of social categories that exercise dominance in productive activities. Second, I look upon the State as a process and not simply a collection of formal entities. Thus, the State is not equivalent to the government; segments of governmental organizations may constitute elements of the State but much of the government is concerned with routine administration of things that are far too mundane to be designated under the rubric “the State.” Third, the State as process emerges in fulfilling four functional requisites: accumulation, legitimation, mediation of inter- and intra-class conflicts, and social reproduction.

This still leaves the definition of the State problematic.

The State, as Marx argued, may constitute the “executive committee of the bourgeoisie” (in the bourgeois State) but this is, at one and the same time, a useful but illusory formulation. It indicates that the State represents the significant, important, “cutting edge” of political economic organization.
In this formulation, the State does not include every petty bureaucrat working for the government but does include segments where decision making power resides. It also includes entities and things outside of government, i.e., in various social sectors that participate in decision making about the political-economic organization of society.

But Marx’ formulation is illusory because it attributes to the State, in my view, too much formal organization. An executive committee implies, for example, that there exists subordinate levels in a formal organizational system and some relationship between subordinate strata and the “executive committee.” It also implies some regularity of organization, i.e., meetings, agreements formally reached, etc. While many of these attributes may exist in the State, other nonformal arrangements also must exist.

Thus the State is a superorganic or metasocial process existing only partially in formal organization, but also in nonformal arrangements, agreements, and understandings that are imminent in the activities of key structural elements of the advanced capitalist countries.

Turning to the middle question: how can there be a transnational State when its political forms have not yet appeared? The answer is that, if a theoretical analysis indicates the existence of a certain phenomenon, it becomes logically incumbent to pursue empirical analysis. What this means concretely is the need to initiate processual forms which might constitute such a State.

In the case in hand, the argument would run something as follows.

First, the national state has become less significant and important since the 1960s. Following Borrego’s (1981) analysis, the nation-state as a political-economic formation peaked around the 1960s; until that time, national interests continued to predominate. While a global economy had emerged much earlier, the dominant political-economic forms were built around the nation. The defeat of the United States in the Viet Nam war marks the end of the period of dominance of the nation-state as a political-economic form.

Second, the emergence of a transnational political economy predates the peaking and the initiation of decline of the nation-state. Here I want to make a distinction, again following Borrego, between the development of a world system based on national political-economic interests and a transnational political economy. In the former, a host of economic organizations emerged concerned with economic exploitation all over the world. This was a period characterized by the term “imperialism.” Imperialism represented the national political form of economic development, i.e., the nation-state pursuing the economic interests of its national bourgeoisie.

Even prior to the 1960s, however, a new economic formation could be discerned, the transnational corporation. Originally referred to as the “multinational corporation,” this semantic formulation was probably accurate in the early phases of the political economic development of these social forms. When companies such as General Motors, Castle and Cooke, Coca-Cola, Phillips, and Exxon (in their original corporate manifestations) moved abroad, they began with a national base, a national orientation, a national leadership, and a national market. As production and markets broadened, the character of these entities have been transformed. While each may continue to have a leadership which is predominantly from one nation and/or more of a tendency to market and distribute in one national location, increasingly the orientations of these corporate entities has shifted. The emphasis shifts from being multinational, i.e., concerned with having locations in a number of nations in which activity is carried on but with a retained national orientation, to becoming transnational, i.e., less concerned with specific national interests, national markets, and/or internal organization which is nationally-based and more concerned with a
global orientation.

Thus, new political-economic forms are emergent, the transnational corporations. Since these economic forms can only partially be controlled by the nation-state, it follows that some new State form must emerge to function as the "executive committee" of a new transnational bourgeoisie. Transnational corporate entities can only partially be controlled by nation-states because so much of their productive, manufacturing, distributing, and marketing functions are nationally-dispersed. The nation-state seeking to "control" a transnational corporation can do so only to the extent that the entity can be located within the nation. Since only part of a transnational corporation is physically located within a nation, no single nation can control or regulate a transnational corporation. Nor does there exist any supernational level of political organization, at present, which can regulate a transnational corporation beyond the borders of nation-states. Thus, concluding Borrego's argument, transnational corporate organization constitutes a new manifestation of capitalism which is only partially regulatable by nation-states, only to the extent that it has physical production and distribution activities within national boundaries. As an overall entity, the transnational corporation is not regulatable by any existing State form since there are no such political forms.

An essential element of the analysis of capitalism is that capitalists and capitalist organizational forms seek to minimize uncertainty. While many aspects of production may have uncertainties, it is reasonable to expect that capitalists, in their relations with each other and, equally important, in their relations with the working class, will want to have some kind of predictability about the rules of the game. Means must be developed within which competition can occur, in which resources and markets can be developed, setting the boundaries on conflict so that capitalists will know what the costs of various production factors will be under any given set of conditions. It is because of the demand for these certainties, predictabilities, rules, that we can logically infer (once we have made assumptions about the character of the State as a given) that a transnational State must become emergent as transnational political economy spreads.

If a transnational State is imminent, how shall we look for it? What rules can we follow in discerning the development of a new political form? What is clear, at the outset, is of what the transnational State does not consist. It does not consist, for example, of the United Nations and/or other subsidiary UN forms although there may be segments within UN structures that may be shaping some of the rules of the new transnational "game" and therefore constitute parts of an emergent transnational State.

Nor does the transnational State consist of political entities such as the European Community and its Common Agricultural Policy. The EC is an entity which functions above the level of the nations encompassed within it but, in fact, it behaves more as a nation-state than as a transnational State. It can regulate certain activities within its borders but it has no capacity to regulate activities beyond. It can influence relationships with former colonial territories of its major nations but it cannot regulate the significant economic inter-relationships on which the transnational corporations are based.

Looking for the Transnational State

Looking for the transnational State resembles Diogenes' task: in the darkness of historical immediacy, it is difficult to discern outlines of new political formations. Let me essay an attempt:

1. The new transnational State must be concerned with the setting of limits or boundaries on the activities of transnational corporations with respect to each other.

2. The new transnational State must be concerned with establishing predictability with
respect to labor, costs, conditions, supply, movements, standards, and markets.

3. The new transnational State does not yet have open, explicit, political character of a formal nature.

4. Therefore, the shape of the new transnational State must be discerned more in informal venues, in formal organizations which have not yet taken transnational character, and/or in formal organizations that have taken transnational character but have not yet been given an explicit legal-political basis.

Two methodological questions might be initially addressed: how and where to look for the transnational State?

The how of this process raises several interesting methodological problems. Since we are dealing with a prefigurative phenomenon in which there is no visibly identifiable entity, two possibilities suggest themselves as to how to go about delineating the phenomenon. First, we might utilize historical analysis to examine the emergence of the modern bourgeois State. Essentially this might entail placing ourselves in feudal Europe sometime after the 12th century to consider the socio-economic conditions that gave rise to the modern State. Then by some comparative process, recognizing the differences between the times and circumstances, ask ourselves questions about where we might discern the shaping of the transnational State.

The second process might entail consideration of entities that would be closest to the development of a transnational State, i.e., in particular those transnational forms that are most advanced, oldest. In this case, it might be advantageous to examine a commodity such as oil since so much of world production and distribution are controlled by seven firms. While many internal processes of the seven firms and their interrelationships are hidden, these organizations are fairly public in the sense that they occupy the attention of many people. Thus, by asking empirical questions of a body of literature on the “seven sisters,” we might discern some of the outlines of the transnational State.

The issue of where to look poses some very different questions. One way to begin is to formulate, at least in preliminary fashion and based on what we currently understand to be the character of the State, a series of functions. By asking where these functions are carried out, we may gain some sense as to where to look for the transnational State.

Following the initial approach suggested under how, one way of functioning might be to take an historical analysis that deals with the emergence of the modern State and seek to abstract some salient elements from it. A useful example can be found in Hechter and Brustein (1980) who argue that three modes of production — sedentary pastoral, petty commodity, and feudal — existed in 12th century western Europe. After comparatively examining the three modes of production, Hechter and Brustein conclude that:

“...state formation will be more likely to the degree that powerful individual actors form two groups on the basis of divergent economic and political interests. The reason is that, in politically divided societies, actors in the more powerful group always have an incentive to band together and create an organization — a state apparatus — to tax, repress, or otherwise expropriate the members of the weaker group. This incentive is magnified if, as in the case of late feudalism, the weaker group seems capable of mounting a challenge to the system of property rights under which the stronger group prospers (p. 1085).”

Hechter and Brustein argue that the growing threat of the bourgeoisie and their allied artisans in the towns led the feudal aristocracy to form the modern State in self-protection. Differing with Marx’ analysis that the bourgeoisie within
feudalism developed class consciousness first, they argue:

"...that in late feudalism the nobility, not the bourgeoisie, was more likely to have attained class consciousness. The modern state was the direct result of this development. Thus, bourgeois class consciousness in the late medieval period did not grow from the seeds of a new, capitalist mode of production so much as reemerge in reaction to the policies of the first modern states (p. 1090)."

This approach suggests that (1) the emergence of the transnational State must occur through some form of opposition, i.e., where those involved in transnational organization are being threatened by opposing forces dependent on some other base; (2) that the emergence of a phenomenon such as the transnational State should be thought about dialectically since it is in the primitive struggle of the burghers against the feudal lords that a modern State emerged at the behest of the feudal lords anxious to protect their property, rights, and prestige from weaker interlopers. This State, in turn, would be captured by the bourgeoisie in the revolutionary struggles that marked the transition to modern capitalist States in Great Britain and France.

Applying the analysis to our problem, we have to ask the question: with which class forces does the transnational bourgeoisie come into conflict that would lead to explorations toward the formation of a transnational State? Three sources of challenge can be potentially identified.

First, there is the international proletariat. A transnational bourgeoisie must deal with a number of national proletariats since its production and distribution facilities are scattered over many nations. In each national case, it must deal with a national (and/or localized) proletariat. The totality of national proletariats, however, is qualitatively different from an international proletariat(5).

A second "figure" with whom the transnational bourgeoisie might find themselves in conflict are their equivalents with the Centrally-Planned Economies(4). Here the problem is that the transnational bourgeoisie is not in conflict (to the extent that I can see) with the ruling classes of the centrally planned economies. Transnational corporations have penetrated the centrally planned economies by the establishment of contractual relations in production (such as Fiat has done extensively throughout the eastern bloc countries such as the Soviet Union and Poland). Similarly, transnational corporations of Japanese and other national origin have now penetrated China.

One conceivable formulation might argue that CPE-based transnational corporations will come into conflict with the capitalist transnational corporations. There are a number of questions that must be raised by this formulation the most important one of which is: are there CPE-based transnational corporations (or their equivalents)? For me, the answer is not clear. My sense is that the equivalent development of the transnational corporation has not yet occurred within the centrally planned economies since no State-operated organizations are involved in production and distribution among the various centrally planned economies.

This leads, then, to the third potential source of conflict. I see this residing primarily with national bourgeoisies. While the transnational bourgeoisie has emerged from national antecedents, it stands in sharp contrast to those segments of the bourgeoisie that are still limited to national boundaries. Here I run into problems of delineating the character of the national bourgeoisie in contrast to the transnational bourgeoisie. Impressionistically, I have the feeling that steelmakers constitute more of a national bourgeoisie than any other category I can call to mind. The problem is that steel production has long been linked to banking and to capital forms that have long been transnationalized. My impression, however, is that steelmakers, at least in the U.S., are more nationally oriented than
many other manufacturers and producers.

In any case, additional empirical research is necessary. However, one can see the possibilities for conflicts between the transnational and national bourgeoisies and this looks like the most probable source of conflict.

What this discussion, developing from Hechter and Brustein, suggests that it is necessary to (1) develop empirical data that distinguishes the transnational bourgeoisie from national bourgeoisies; (2) examine conflicting loci between the two; and (3) seek to delineate the loci of “solutions” to such conflicts.

Turning to a consideration of where to look for the manifestations of the transnational State provides a different kind of analysis.

First, since there is no such State but we are hypothesizing an emergent force known as the transnational bourgeoisie, there will have to be some kind of apparatus in which a normative organization of the transnational bourgeoisie and the transnational State emerges. An example can be found in the Trilateral Commission, organized as a manifestation of “the transnationalisation of the State” (Gill 1990: 1). The Commission draws its membership from major economic and political figures in Trilateral nation-states including the U.S., western Europe, and Japan. Its purposes are to improve communications, develop policies that the Trilateral States can follow, and to pursue the implementation of such policies within their national governments and societies (Gill 1990: Chapter 1).

The internal processes of the Commission are intended to produce agreements that can be pursued in a unified manner in the national societies of advanced capitalism. Out of this develops a common normative orientation about how the world ought to be organized. Since the leadership of a number of transnational corporations are prominent in Trilateral Commission, the Commission represents a potential venue for the development of the normative system of the transnational State. But the development of a normative order can only be accomplished in part by discussions over general analytic questions. Perhaps as important, if not more so, is the development of a normative order through specific interactions over concrete activities of the TNCs. What I have in mind here is that the TNCs are not simply involved in autonomous production and distribution activities, i.e., they also must interrelate with each other. Perhaps this can best be illustrated by utilizing an example that developed in the citrus research: the setting of standards for frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ).

In the international trade in FCOJ there is an international standard used by all agencies: it is 64 degrees Brix (degrees Brix is a measure of soluble solids [such as sugar]). This measure, used in all movement of FCOJ in global trade, is not the standard which is used for juice sold at retail (11.8 degrees Brix), by U.S. regulators in setting the standard for concentrate sold at retail (41.8 degrees Brix), or by the state of Florida until 1980 (44.8 degrees Brix). Nor is it the standard which is utilized by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in the Codex Alimentarius which ostensibly sets standards for international trade (20 degrees Brix)

Thus we have an interesting case in which the de facto standard in global trade, acceptable to all parties involved in this trade, is not the same as the standard used by any governmental or intergovernmental agency such as the FAO. The 65 degrees Brix standard is an arbitrary one since it has at least been feasible to concentrate orange juice to 72 degrees Brix (Redd 1983:17). Where did this de facto standard come from? Clearly not from the FAO or the standard setting agencies of the U.S. government.

Some group, somewhere, determined the global standard and that standard has apparently been in use for several decades. It is through the discovery of such standard setting processes which are probably informal (in the sense that
they are not set by any formally delineated governmental or intergovernmental bodies) that one must look for the emergent transnational State.

For, clearly, commonly understood standards are essential to the accumulation activity of global capitalist enterprises. Without such common understandings, each transaction would have to be individually negotiated and distinctive standards set. At the level of the nation, it is the national government that normally establishes such standards. Since there is no transnational government, we can impute the existence of informal instrumentalities where such standards are actually developed and accepted. It is in such instrumentalities that it becomes possible to impute the emergent forms of the transnational State.

Conclusion

In all likelihood, this paper raises more questions that it resolves. Frankly exploratory, I have argued for the logical existence—or, more appropriately, the emergence—of something I have labelled the “transnational State.” Based upon the reasoning that something known as the State must exist in capitalist economies to formulate the rules of the economic game (as well as fulfilling other functions), the most important of which is the accumulation function, my argument is that, with the increasing significance of economic organization that transcends the nation state in the form of the transnational corporation, some metasocial organism must emerge to facilitate the “normal” functions of capitalist economy.

How, where, and in what forms that transnational state will emerge remains unclear; what is clear is that some kind(s) of organizational entities must undertake to regulate the basic functions of capitalist societies, functions of accumulation, legitimation, mediation of inter- and intra-class conflict, and of social reproduction. Like Hechter and Brustein’s actors in the period of feudalism, we may not have a very clear notion of the way in which the new State is emergent, the very exigencies of economic evolution indicate the emergence of new state forms.

Notes

1. For a review of this literature and the primary arguments about the theory of the state, see the paper by Bonanno (1991) in this issue.

2. I will be developing this delineation of the state as process and its functional requisites in a forthcoming study, “Trampling Out Advantages: The Political Economy of California Grapes.”

3. Distinctions should be made conceptually between an international proletariat (which would be defined as a number of national proletarians having developed forms of organization transcending national boundaries) and a transnational proletariat (which would be constituted of an integrated organizational form based on production and distribution of the transnational corporation rather than on national boundaries [and therefore not limited by national legal systems]). It would be helpful here to use the concept of structural parallelism (Lipset 1961), i.e., working class organization is constructed organizationally on forms which parallel the bourgeoisie with which it must deal. Just as the transnational corporation now transcends nation boundaries and legal systems, a proletariat might. It should, of course, be noted that international organization of the working class is very weak and the organization of a transnational proletariat exists only in the barest of prefigurative forms.

4. This designation describes the so-called “socialist” or “communist” countries ranging from the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Albania, to Yugoslavia. I am aware of the conceptual problems involved in the usage of the formulation “centrally planned economies”. Countries such as the U.S., France, Great Britain, West Germany, etc., are now considerably centrally planned in their economies. In addition, events since 1990 have challenged the viability of central planning in these economies.

5. The Codex Alimentarius is a collection of internationally adopted food standards presented in a uniform manner” (Food and Agriculture Organization 1981:21).

6. I experienced an interesting disjunction in a discussion with one of the persons responsible for administration of the Codex Alimentarius standards determination process in Rome in 1985. This official informed me that the international standard for FCOJ was 20 degrees Brix; when I informed him that the standard which was used in global trade (according to the trade literature) was 64 degrees Brix, we had one of those fundamental breakdowns in communication.
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RESUMEN

La Transnacionalización de la Producción Agrícola: Palineceso del Estado Transnacional

Este artículo explora, en lo teórico, el surgimiento del Estado transnacional. Parte de la experiencia histórica del Estado a nivel nacional -el cual cumple cuatro funciones principales: acumulación, legitimación, mediació en los conflictos intra e inter-clase, y reproducción social-, así como, de la utilización de los resultados de una investigación empírica sobre un producto agrícola: el jugo de naranja concentrado. Se argumenta que la creciente importancia de las corporaciones transnacionales requieren de un aparato de Estado que traspase las fronteras de la nación. En este sentido, el presente trabajo sugiere formas y medios de abordar este fenómeno.

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