The Sociology of Development and Under Development: Are There Lessons for Economics?

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Economists have seldom drawn knowledge from sociology in their analysis of the development process. In this paper I attempt to evaluate the contributions of sociologists who have worked within the traditions of modernization theory and of dependency and world systems theory in terms of their potential contributions to research by development economists. I conclude that metatheory in sociology has little to offer economists at this stage and that I should extend my review to cover a number of "middle range" theories that are more directly related to applied research by development economists.

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Introduction

In research conducted over the last two decades, Yujiro Hayami and I have outlined a model of economic development in which both technical and institutional change were treated as largely endogenous to the economic system (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). Technical change is treated as induced by changes in factor supplies and product demand and by institutional change. Institutional change is treated as induced by changes in factor supplies and product demand and by technical change. Advances in natural science knowledge reduce the cost of technical change and advances in social science knowledge reduce the cost of institutional change.

The implications of the induced technical change process for agricultural productivity growth is illustrated in Figure 1. Those parts of the world where land has been scarce relative to labor have followed a biological technology path. The rate of growth in output per hectare has generally been more rapid than the rate of growth of output per worker. Those parts of the world where land has been abundant relative to labor have followed a mechanical technology path. The rate of growth in output per worker has exceeded the rate of growth in output per hectare. Countries, or regions, with more balanced land-labor ratios have followed a more balanced productivity growth path. Rigorous tests of the induced innovation model are presented for the period 1880-1980 in the Hayami and Ruttan book on Agricultural Development.

Symbol key for

Argentina	Ar	Norway	No
Australia	Aus	Pakistan	Pak
Austria	Au	Paraguay	Par
Bangladesh	Ba	Peru	Pe
Belgium (& Luxemburg)	Be	Philippines	Ph
Brazil	Br	Portugal	Po
Canada	Ca	South Africa	SA
Chile	Ch	Spain	Sp
Colombia	Co	Sri Lanka	Sr
Denmark	De	Surinam	Su
Egypt	Eg	Sweden	Swe
Finland	Fi	Switzerland	Swi
France	Fr	Syria	Sy
Germany, F. R.	Ge	Taiwan	Ta
Greece	Gr	Turkey	Tu
India	In	U.K.	UK
Ireland	Ir	U.S.A.	USA
Israel	Is	Venezuela	Ve
Italy	It	Yugoslavia	Yu
Japan	Ja		
Libya	Li		
Mauritius	Ma		
Mexico	Me		
Netherlands	Ne		
New Zealand	NZ		



Historical growth paths of agricultural productivity of Denmark, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States for 1880-1980 compared with intercountry cross-section observations of selected countries in 1980.

Source: Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International Perspective, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univeristy Press, 1985), Chapter 5.

A Pattern Model

We have also made some preliminary suggestions concerning the relationships between cultural endowments and technical and institutional change[1]. The pattern model that we used to map the general equilibrium relationships between resource endowments, cultural endowments, technology and institutions is reproduced here as Figure 2. The model suggests the importance of going beyond the conventional general equilibrium model in which resource endowments, technologies, institutions and culture are treated as given. In the study of long-term social and economic change the formal microeconomic models used in the Hayami-Ruttan work and in the work of others to analyze the supply and demand for technical and institutional change can be thought of as "nested" within the general equilibrium framework of Figure 2.

One advantage of the "pattern model" outlined in Figure 2 is that it helps to identify areas of ignorance. Our capacity to model and test the relationships between resource endowments and technical change is relatively strong. Our capacity to model and test the relationships between cultural endowments and either technical or institutional change is relatively weak. A second advantage of the model is that it is useful in identifying the components that enter into other attempts to account for secular economic and social change. Failure to analyze historical change in a general equilibrium context tends to result in a unidimensional perspective on the relationships' bearing on technical and institutional change.

For example, historians working within the Marxist tradition often tend to view technical change as dominating both institutional and cultural change. In his book Oriental Despotism, Karl Wittfogel views the irrigation technology used in wet rice cultivation in East Asia as determining political organization (Wittfogel, 1957). As it applies to Figure 1, his primary emphasis was on the impact of resources and technology on institutions as in (B) and (C).

A serious misunderstanding can be observed in contemporary neo-Marxian critiques of the green revolution. These criticisms have focused attention almost entirely on the impact of technical change on labor and land tenure relations. Both the radical and populist critics have emphasized relation (B), but they have tended to ignore relationships (A) and (C). This bias has led to repeated failure to identify effectively the separate effects of population growth and technical change on the growth and distribution of income. The analytical power of the more complete induced innovation model is illustrated in the Laguna Village (Philippines) study by Yujiro Hayami and Maso Kikuchi (Hayami et al. and Kikuchi, 1981, 1989). In Laguna, increases in population pressure (C) and technical change in rice production (B) resulted in a substantial change in both land tenure and labor market relationships.

Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz identify a primary function of property rights as providing incentives to achieve greater internalization of externalities (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973:16-27). They consider that the clear specification of property rights reduces transaction costs in the face of growing competition for the use of scarce resources as a result of population growth and/or growth in product demand. Douglass North and Robert P. Thomas, building on the Alchian-Demsetz paradigm, attempted to explain the economic growth of western Europe between 900 and 1700 primarily in terms of changes in property institutions (North and Thomas, 1970:1-17, 1973; Field, 1981:74-98). During the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, the pressure of population against increasingly scarce land resources induced innovations in property rights that in turn created profitable opportunities for the generation and adoption of labor-intensive technical changes in agriculture. The population decline in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was viewed as a primary factor leading to the demise of feudalism and the rise of the national state (line C). These institutional changes in turn opened up new possibilities for economies of scale in nonagricultural production and in trade (line b).

In a more recent work, Mancur Olson has emphasized the proliferation of institutions as a source of economic decline (Olson, 1982: 163-164). He also regards broad-



Interrelationships among changes in resource endowments, cultural endowments, technology and institutions.

Source: Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International Perspective, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 111.

based encompassing organizations as having incentives to generate growth and redistribute incomes to their members with little excess burden. For example, a broadly based coalition that encompasses the majority of agricultural producers is more likely to exert political pressure for growth-oriented policies that will enable its members to obtain a larger share of a larger national product than a smaller organization that represents the interests of the producers of a single commodity. Small organizations representing narrow interest groups are more likely to pursue the interests of their members at the expense of the welfare of other producers and the general public. In contrast, an even more broadly based farmer-labor coalition would be more concerned with promoting economic growth than would an organization representing a single sector. But large groups are, in Olson's view, inherently unstable because rational individuals will tend not to incur the costs of contributing to the realization of the large group program — they have strong incentives to act as free riders. As a result, organizational "space" in a stable society will be increasingly occupied by special interest "distributional coalitions." These distributional coalitions make political life divisive. They slow down the adoption of new technologies (line b) and limit the capacity to reallocate resources (line c). The effect is to slow down economic growth or in some cases initiate a period of economic decline.

In our book on agricultural development we concluded that substantial insight into the processes of institutional innovation and diffusion can be obtained by treating institutional change as an economic response to changes in resource endowments and technical change. But we were less than completely satisfied with the conclusion. We insisted on the importance of cultural endowments that economists have typically concealed under the rubric of tastes[2]. But our capacity to develop rigorous empirical tests capable of identifying the significance of the relationships between cultural endowments and other elements in the model remains unsatisfactory. Until our colleagues in the other social sciences provide us with more helpful analytical tools, we are forced to adhere to a strategy that focuses primarily on the interactions between resource endowments, technical change and institutional change. This strategy does have the clear advantage of allowing us to explore how far a strategy based on the straight forward extension of standard microeconomic theory will take us in the analysis of both technical and institutional change[3].

Since completing Agricultural Development I have been engaged in an effort to explore more systematically the potential contributions of other social sciences to an understanding of the development process (Ruttan, 1988:247-272; 1991:265-292). This paper represents a preliminary effort to examine the sociological literature on development in an attempt to provide greater insight into what economists working in the field of development should learn from the large literature on the sociological aspects of development.

Why Sociology?

Why should development economists or economists concerned with the economic development of poor countries be interested in the contributions to development theory and knowledge by sociologists? One possible reason is that a synthesis of economic and social development theory into a more general theory of socio-economic development would provide greater depth to attempt to understand the development process. This interest might be strongest among economists who approach the development process from a "positivist" or "scientific" perspective. A second potential source of interest is of economists who are interested in development policy or development planning with the objective of achieving more rapid economic growth in developing economies. Knowledge of the interplay between social structure and the response to policy initiatives, and the capacity to utilize such knowledge in policy and plan formation and implementation, could improve the effectiveness of policy and program design. A third reason why economists might be interested is because of a concern about the social impacts of economic growth. A broader concern with utility or social welfare implies a concern that the material benefits of economic development might be so destructive to the non-material components

of consumption that it generates such a strong political backlash as to disrupt the capacity to pursue policies leading to sustained development. Ever since economists began to concern themselves with issues of economic development, the mutual interaction between economic development and change in social structure has been recognized. Bert Hoselitz noted that "in spite of the many criticisms that have been levied against the Marxian theories, Marx's interpretation of capitalism as a socio-economic system and of its changes as alterations in the relations between social classes and in the forms and organizations of production has been quite generally accepted even by his most ardent critics" (Hoselitz, 1960:53).

Knowledge from sociology has seldom, however, been formally introduced into the analysis of the development process or of developing countries by economists (Swedberg, 1990a). Cultural and social constraints on the effectiveness of economic policies intended to generate economic growth have been treated as intuitively obvious. Kindleberger's 1952 comment on World Bank country analysis reports remains apt:

> . . . (T)hese are essays in comparative statics. The missions bring to the underdeveloped country a notion of what a developed country is like. They observe the underdeveloped country. They subtract the former from the latter. The difference is a program. Most of the members of the missions come from developed countries with highly articulated institutions for achieving social, economic and political ends. Ethnocentricity leads inevitably to the conclusion that the way to achieve comparable levels of capital formation, productivity, and consumption is to duplicate these institutions. . .
>
> (Kindleberger, 1952:391-392)

One of the more ambitious attempts by an economist to draw on sociology to interpret the process of economic development was by Bert Hoselitz in the early 1950s. Hoselitz, founder of Economic Development and Cultural Change, drew particularly on the set of "pattern variables" in the structuralist-functionalist model outlined by Talcott Parsons. The five pattern alternatives outlined by Parsons follow: (a) achievement versus ascription in the determination of status; (b) universalism versus particularism in value orientations; (c) specificity versus diffusion in individual economic roles; (d) affectivity versus affective neutrality in personal or group relationships; and (e) self-orientation versus collectivity orientation in political and economic roles (Hoselitz, 1960:23-84).

Hoselitz singled out the first three pairs as particularly significant in accounting for differences in economic development. He hypothesized that an "advanced" economy could be expected to:

> exhibit predominantly universalistic norms in determining the selection process for the attainment of economically relevant roles; the roles themselves are functionally highly specific; that the predominant norms by which the selection process for those roles is regulated are based on the principle of achievement, and that the holders of positions in the power elite, and even in other elites, are expected to maintain collectivity oriented relations to social objects of economic significance. In an underdeveloped society, on the contrary, particularism, function diffusion, and the principle of ascription predominate as regulators of social-structural relations . . . and the orientation of actors in economically or politically influenced roles is determined predominantly by considerations of their ego.
>
> (Hoselitz, 1960:41-42)

Hoselitz attempted to apply the pattern model to interpret the literature on the role of elites, particularly the entrepreneur and entrepreneurship, as deviant personalities who play a critical role as actors in the transition of a society from a traditional to a modern structure. In retrospect, the effort carried little conviction (Frank, 1969).

My interest in exploring the sociological literature arises in large part out of concern over the limited success of development economists in specifying the sources of supply of institutional innovation - in specifying the sources of the actions needed to set in motion the process of institutional innovation. The closest we came to dealing with this issue was to argue that advances in social science knowledge had the effect of shifting the supply curve for institutional innovation to the right - of reducing the cost of institutional change (Bingswanger and Ruttan, 1978; Hayami and Kikuchi, 1981; Ruttan and Hayami, 1984:203-223; Ruttan, 1984:203-223; Anderson and Hayami, 1986). My personal answer to the question of "why sociology?" has been articulated very clearly by James S. Coleman:

> A major question that a theory of institutions should answer is how and under what conditions a formal institutional structure comes into being, buttressed by formal laws or rules rather than by an informal structure supported by norms. This is part of a broader agenda for sociology, that of developing theory for the constructed social organization that is coming to replace the primordial or spontaneous social organization that was the foundation of societies of the past. The institutional structuring that Parsons had in mind were these whose control was based on norms, not formal rules or laws. The social organization upon which these structures developed was spontaneous, not formal. Yet societies are undergoing a major change from the form of organization that generates norms and customs which institutional structures grow around to a form of organization more fully based on purpose or design. Rules and laws are established for particular purposes, and resources necessary for enforcement are provided.
>
> (Coleman, 1990:337)[4]

An effective response to the research agenda outlined by Coleman is precisely what development economists would find most useful from sociology.

What Happened to Modernization Theory?

When economists began after World War II to extend the analyses of economic growth and development in the Third World, they carried with them the social (or economic) accounting system that had been developed in the 1920s and 1930s by pioneers such as Simon Kuznets and Richard Stone. By 1939 the new metric had been extended by Colin Clark's massive effort to include a large number of developed and developing countries and colonial territories (Clark, 1940).

When sociologists ventured into the same territory they did not bring with them either a clear conception or metric of social development. The founders of the discipline of sociology - Marx, Weber, Durkheim and others - had been concerned with development, particularly the transition from feudalism to capitalism. But by the 1950s the earlier historicist and evolutionary approaches to social progress or development had largely been discredited or abandoned (Blumer, 1966:3-11). Instead, sociologists brought with them to the study of development a set of empirical generalizations from classical 19th century sociology that characterized the distinctions between "traditional" and "modern" societies.

"Traditional society was depicted as static, with little differentiation or specialization, a mechanical division of labor, a low level of urbanization and literacy, and a strong agrarian basis as its main focus of population"

(Eisenstadt, 1973:10). Modern societies were everything that traditional societies were not. They possessed "a high level of differentiation, a high degree of organic division of labor, specialization, urbanization, literacy, and exposure to mass media, and imbued with a continuous drive toward progress. . . . Above all, traditional society was conceived as bound by the cultural horizons set by its tradition, and modern society was considered culturally dynamic and oriented to change and innovation" (Eisenstadt, 1973:10)[5].

They also brought with them a "structural-functionalist" or "systems" theory of social organization and action that had been elaborated by Talcott Parsons during the 1930s. In the structural-functionalist perspective:

> societies are more or less self-sufficient, adaptive social systems, characterized by varying degrees of differentiation, and with roles and institutions . . . as their principle units. The balance or equilibrium, of the various parts of the whole is maintained for as long as certain functional prerequisites are satisfied and, generally speaking, an institution is 'explained' once the functions it fulfills are satisfied. Finally, the entire system, or any part of it is kept together through the operation of a central value system broadly embodying social consensus.
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> (Harrison, 1988:6)[6]

Societies were viewed as having interrelated sets of structures and functions reinforced by social norms and oriented toward achievement of systemic goals[7].

The reconceptualization of "modernization" theory, incorporating the structural-functionalist framework was summarized by Bernstein as follows: "(1) Modernization is a total social process associated with (or subsuming) economic development in terms of the preconditions, concommitants, and consequences; (2) this process constitutes a 'universal pattern'..." (Bernstein, 1971:141). Those sociologists closest to the Parsonian tradition stressed the transformation of structure—the modernization of social systems. Those who were more strongly influenced by psychology stressed personal transformation—the modernizations of the individual. It was also possible to distinguish two schools—those who were mainly concerned with those aspects of modernization most closely related to economic development and those whose focus was primarily in those aspects most closely related to political development. Modernization theory was rapidly adopted by political scientists working in the area of political development and became a central conceptual framework for the program of research carried out under the auspices of Social Science Research Council Committee on Comparative Politics (Ruttan, 1990:265-292). Economists, as usual, resisted any transfer of knowledge from sociology and avoided, by and large, even use of the term "modernization."

One of the earliest, and most influential studies of modernization, drawing both on the classical traditional-modern dichotomy and the Parsonian structural-functionalist theory, was carried out by Daniel Lerner in the mid-1950s. "In The Passing of Traditional Society" (1958), he examined the process of modernization in a number of Middle East countries. The perspective that emerged from Lerner's studies:

> is of a world in which modernization is a global process. . . . Traditional society is on the wane, and Islam is 'defenseless' against the 'rationalist and positivist' spirit. In particular, the role of the mass media is crucial, and is associated with a cluster of other indices of development: urbanization, accompanied by an increase in literacy, leads to an increase in exposure to the mass media. At the same time, the increasingly literate and urbanized population participates in a wider economic system. Modernity comes about through changes in institutions but also in persons.
>
> (Harrison, 1988:16)

For Lerner a crucial aspect of modernization is the development of personality characterized by rationality and empathy which "enables newly mobile persons to operate efficiently in a changing world" (Lerner, 1958:49-50).

By the mid-1960s the wealth of empirical detail generated by modernization research in sociology and in political science was leading to a critical reassessment of the empirical generalizations and to a reformulation of the structural-functionalist model. The criticisms of the empirical generalizations have been summarized by Eisenstadt.

First, "even if traditional societies were topologically different from modern ones, they might vary greatly with regard to the degree to which their traditions impacted or facilitated the transition to modernity" (Eisenstadt, 1973:101).

Second, a distinction was made between tradition and traditionalism—with traditionalism defined as "the more extremist, negative reaction to forces of modernity, and... tradition as the general reservoir of behavior and symbols of a society" (Eisenstadt, 1973:101).

Third, was the recognition of "persistence in modern or modernizing societies of strong traditions and binding ways of behavior rooted in the past" (Eisenstadt, 1973:102) rather than the positive contributions of many such traditions to the integrity of social processes.

Fourth, was the documentation "of how traditional forces or groups, be they castes or tribal units tended to reorganize themselves in new, modern settings in very effective ways" (Eisenstadt, 1973:102).

Fifth, was a growing recognition that in many "new states" whose independence movements had been shaped by modern Western models "older, traditional modes or models of politics tended to assert themselves" (Eisenstadt, 1973:102).

These criticisms of the traditional-modern generalizations lead to the recognition of what Eisenstadt regards as two critical aspects of institutional development associated with modernization. "First, was the recognition of the possibility that partial 'modernization'... might reinforce traditional systems by infusion of new forms of organization.... Second, was the growing recognition of . . . the systemic viability of... transitional systems... by emphasizing that these societies may develop in directions that do not necessarily lead to any given "end stage" as envisaged in the initial model of modernization these analyses have undermined some of the basic assumptions of theories of convergence" (Eisenstadt, 1973:102).

Eisenstadt argues that these criticisms of the validity of the "traditional-modern dichotomy combined with the increased dissatisfaction with the social systems assumption of the structural-functionalist approach weakened the commitment by sociologists to what appeared to be the excessively deterministic implications of modernization theory.

But Eisenstadt is not clear on where these criticisms leave modernization theory. In an earlier paper he had treated the transitional society as an intermediate evolution from a traditional to a modern society. In the transitional stage "the main social functions or the major institutional spheres of society became disassociated from one another, allocated to specialized collectives and roles, and organized in relatively specific and autonomous symbolic and organizational framework within the confines of the same institutionalized system" (Eisenstadt, 1973:102). If society is to avoid disintegration or "regression", a continuous process of reintegration of the social system must occur—and may give rise to new types of social, political, or cultural structure, each of which has different potentialities for further change, for breakdown or for development" (Eisenstadt, 1969:376). In Tradition, Change, and Modernity, Eisenstadt appears to promise a more modern definition of modernity that is less subject to the criticisms listed above. It is possible that he has done so. But if so, it has been so hidden in the obscure verbiage with which Eisenstadt tends to conceal his contributions that I have missed it.

Parsons' response to the deepening of knowledge about the social systems of new societies was to introduce an evolutionary orientation into the structural-functionalist model (Parsons, 1964:339-

357)[9]. In this model the simplest social system includes four evolutionary universals—culture, in the form of religion; communication through language; social organization based on kinship; and technology. Cultural patterns regulate the social, psychological, and organic levels of the system; linguistic communication mediates social relations among personalities; kinship represents the initial stage in the social relationship between the individual and the species; technology is the primary means by which the individual and society establish adaptive relations to the physical environment. Societies that break out of the "primitive" stage of social evolution are characterized by evolution along four sets of additional evolutionary universals. These include (a) social stratification and cultural legitimization; (b) bureaucratic organization and money and the market complex; (c) generalized universalistic norms; and (d) democratic association.

Stratification provides a form of status differentiation that permits hierarchical differentiation that is independent of kinship. In the initial stages of development, it opens new opportunities other than ascription, for the assumption of specialized responsibility. But as a society evolves toward full modernity, "stratification often becomes a predominantly conservative force" (Parsons, 1964:345). Legitimization is closely related to stratification. It is necessary that societies provide a rationale for differentiated roles such as the separation of political and religious leadership. "As evolutionary universals, stratification and legitimization are associated with the developmental problems of breaking through the ascriptive nexus of kinship, on the one hand, and of "traditionalized" culture, on the other. In turn they provide the basis for differentiation of a system that has previously, in the relevant respects, been undifferentiated" (Parsons, 1964:346).

The second pair of evolutionary universals are administrative bureaucracy and money and markets. The crucial feature of bureaucracy is the institutionalization of the authority of the office—"the differentiation of the role of incumbent from a person's other role-involvements, above all from his kinship roles" (Parsons, 1964:347). Money and market exchange releases the mobilization of resources from excessive reliance in the two alternative systems available to society: (a) the direct or forcible requisitioning of resources and (b) the activation of nonpolitical solidarities and commitments (such as those of community, cast, or ethnic identity). Money and markets permit the "emancipation of resources from ascriptive bonds" (Parsons, 1964:349-350).

The last two evolutionary universals are generalized universalistic norms and democratic association. A general legal system is one example. It is "applicable to the society as a whole rather than to a few functional or segmented sectors, highly generalized in terms of principles and standards, and relatively independent of both the religious agencies that legitimize the normative order of the society and vested interest groups in the operative sector, particularly in government (Parsons, 1964:351)[9]. The basic argument for considering democratic association a universal "is that the larger and more complex a society becomes the more important is effective political organization, not only in its administrative capacity, but also, and not least, in its support of a universalistic legal order. Political effectiveness includes both the scale and operative flexibility of the organization of power". Nevertheless, power "as a generalized societal medium, depends overwhelmingly on a consensual element" (Parsons, 1964:355)[10].

The addition of an evolutionary dynamic to the pattern variables of the Parsonian structural-functionalist model was clearly a major advance. The older traditional-modern dichotomy was a "black-box" comparative static model in which diffusion of technology, institutions and culture provided the mechanisms to force the transition from traditional to modern. The specification of the evolutionary pattern variables—social stratification, cultural legitimization, bureaucratic organization, money and the market universalistic norms, and democratic association represent a separate but closely related set of variables along which it is possible to trace social development. The social systems perspective occupied a role somewhat similar to that of equilibrium in economics.

Disequilibrium—or lack of articulation—among the several evolutionary universals could provide the analyst a guide to development that would lead in the direction of equilibrium and closer articulation (Moore, 1964b:888).[11]

From the perspective of the early 1990s it appears that by the mid-1960s a theoretical base had been established for the pursuit of a highly productive social development research agenda. By the end of the 1960s, however, both the theme of modernization and the evolutionary version of the structural-functionalist model had largely been abandoned as guides to research by sociologists concerned with Third World development. In the next sections I attempt to examine why development sociology turned away from what appeared to be such a promising research agenda. Before doing so, however, it is possible to make a few preliminary conjectures.

The evolutionary version of the structural-functionalist model was exceedingly abstract. It seems likely that further advances would have required a level of formalization in analysis comparable to the general equilibrium approach in economics. Sociology, as a discipline, was not prepared to move in the direction of the greater abstraction and formalization implied by such an agenda. A second factor limiting commitment to the evolutionary structural-functionalist model is that development sociologists seemed more committed to advancing their understanding of the social aspects of political and economic development than to advancing the concept of social development. Another way of stating the same point is that there is in sociology a strong commitment to social problem solving and an eclectic approach to theory and method. A third reason is that the systems or equilibrium implications of such a model had become increasingly unacceptable to many development sociologists by the mid-1960s (Coleman, 1986:1310-1311).

Even in the 1950s, the modernization perspective had, as noted above, been criticized for drawing on the characteristics of Western urban-industrial society for its definition of the modern. By the late 1960s this criticism had intensified as sociologists became both more fully aware of the technical and institutional constraints on the process of modernization and increasingly skeptical of the benefits of modernization in societies undergoing rapid economic development. Applied research in sociology became fragmented among subdisciplines and social theory became dominated by a plethora of antipositivist, subjectivist, interpretive and constructionist perspectives.

Dependency, World Systems and Underdevelopment

The critics who rejected the ethnocentrism of the Parsonian model are, as Harrison suggests, faced with a difficult problem. If they believe that development is in any way "progressive", but reject the evolutionary perspective, what do they put in its place (Harrison, 1988:40)?

The search for an alternative was the product of profound disillusionment among many social scientists with the impact of Western economic cultural and military penetration into non-Western societies. In the United States this disillusionment was associated with United States efforts to resist radical revolution and reform in Latin America and Southeast Asia (Horowitz, 1982:79). Students of modernization who had viewed their research as a contribution to United States development assistance efforts were discredited. Consensus theory was viewed as providing an ideological cover for support of conservative or authoritarian regimes. Irving Louis Horowitz asserted: "consensus involves a general acceptance of the authority of the group, common traditions, and rules for inducting and indoctrinating new members" (Horowitz, 1972:487). He went on to insist that "the most important task for sociology today is to fashion methods adequate for studying social order in a world of conflicting interests, standards, and values" (Horowitz, 1972:490)[12].

The response to these concerns was the embracement of a new radical macro-sociology that owed more to economists and historians working within a neo-Marxist paradigm than to the work of

sociologists themselves. The speed with which the new perspective, labeled "underdevelopment: theory or "world systems" theory, was embraced by many sociologists was surprising, even to many radical critics of modernization theory (Horowitz, 1972:509)[13]. To an economist, it is surprising how a school of economics, radical political economy, largely ignored or viewed as "bad economics" by mainstream economics, so rapidly established a bridgehead and then set an agenda for theory and policy research in sociology (and in political science). In his book on The Sociology of Modernization and Development, David Harrison devotes more pages to underdevelopment and world systems theory than to modernization theory—and relatively few of the references are to works by sociologists.

The underdevelopment world systems approach to the sociology of development represents a synthesis of three separate traditions. One is The Latin American Structuralist school, represented by the work the Argentine economist Raul Prebish and other colleagues associated with the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). The structuralist school employed the conventional tools of economics, particularly supply, demand, and trade elasticities to argue that during the early post-war period the gains of productivity growth in commodity production in Latin America were being transferred to the developed countries of North America and Europe in the form of lower prices while the productivity gains in manufacturing in the developed countries were, as a result of monopoly organization, retained and shared among workers and owners, rather than being passed on to customers in Latin America. Their policy prescription was import substitution.

The second tradition was a variant of the Marxist theory of imperialism advanced by the Stanford University economist Paul Baran in the mid-1950s (Baran, 1973). In his work on imperialism, Lenin had stressed that imperialism was the instrument by which capitalism would be transmitted to the Third World—and would ultimately weaken the domination of the advanced capitalist nations (Harrison, 1988:68). Baran stood Lenin on his head. Baran saw it as both in the interests and within the power of monopoly capitalism to permanently extract surpluses from the raw material supplying countries of the Third World. "For Baran the only way Third World countries could escape from the economic impasse was to withdraw from the world capitalist system completely and introduce socialist economic planning" (Harrison, 1988:71).

The third tradition was the world systems perspective advanced by the social historians Immanuel Wallerstein, Samir Amin, and Arghiri Emmanuel. The world systems perspective, particularly in the work of Wallerstein, insisted that the developing world had been intimately linked to the world capitalist system since at least the 16th century (Wallerstein, 1979; Emmanuel, 1972; Amin, 1976).

But it was the vigorous attack by Andre Gunder Frank, drawing his intellectual inspiration from Baran and his empirical evidence from the work of the ECLA economists, on the received work by sociologists and economists on modernization and development that was most influential in the popularizing the underdevelopment world systems perspective among a younger generation of development sociologists (Booth, 1975:68). The central theme of Frank's work was that it was world capitalism which created and maintained the conditions of underdevelopment in the Third World—the same historical process of expansion and development of capitalism throughout the world has simultaneously generated and continues to generate both economic development in the center and underdevelopment on the periphery (Frank, 1967, 1969, 1971).

Why did Frank's work, particularly the two books published in the late 1960s, generate so much attention from sociologists? It was not his original contribution that carried his work across disciplinary boundaries. Baran's earlier work had been largely neglected. Rather it was his role as "the great popularizer: it was his voice-strident, passionate, dogmatic, contemptuous and insistent—to which students of the late 1960s and 1970s responded" (Harrison, 1988:81). But this cannot be a complete answer. The insistence on the negative

effects of technical and cultural diffusion and that class relations extended across national boundaries was particularly appealing to an already radicalized younger generation of American and European scholars (Benton, 1978:217-236; Collins, 1986:133-155). They were prepared to believe that the developed countries not only enjoyed an "unequal exchange" but that capitalist development in the First World was responsible for the "undevelopment" of the Third World. The fact that underdevelopment and world systems theory was based to a more significant degree than modernization theory on the work of Third World scholars also added to its appeal.

By the mid-1980s commitment to the "development of underdevelopment" perspective had largely eroded. Modernization re-emerged as an important—or at least continuing—research agenda (Eisenstadt, 1987). This was in part due to a particularly vigorous criticism of scholars committed to classical Marxism. Marxist scholars were particularly critical of the implication that the capitalist world system had existed well before the industrial revolution and the neglect of Third World class structure conflict as a source of change[14].

More important, however, was the widening discrepancy between some of the more extravagant implications of the theory and the record of economic and political development in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in Latin America, which had earlier served as the incubator for underdevelopment theory. The assertion that increased external linkage resulted in retrogression on the periphery could not be sustained. Industrialization occurred most rapidly in those Third World nations with relatively strong and open linkages to the world economy. In addition, the posture of the United States toward military regimes in Latin America and elsewhere has shifted from support to restraint.

But the underdevelopment-world systems perspective has resulted in a permanent enlargement of the research agenda for the sociology of development (Evans and Stephens, 1988:739-773; Horowitz, 1982:89-111). For the modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s, linkage between developed and developing countries was primarily a one-way street. Modernization was a consequence of the diffusion of technology institutions and culture from the developed to the developing world. By the 1970s it was clear that this model no longer held. Underdevelopment theory itself was an intellectual import into the developed world from the undeveloped. And, remarkably, it retained intellectual currency in the developed world after it had lost much of its intellectual appeal in its centers of origin. There is no longer any serious disagreement that development sociologists must take a much broader range of international influences into account in their analysis of domestic economic development whether they are working in the more developed or less developed countries of the world.

The broader agenda must go well beyond the impact of the penetration of international capital to include the effects of such influences as international migration of refugees, workers and intellectuals; the rising protests against modernization such as the revival of fundamentalist orientations in the world's major religions; the shifting emphasis in the struggle among major nations between emphasis on commercial and ideological advantage; the continuing force of apartheid—of racial and ethnic discrimination—in post-modern as well as in modernizing societies; the transnational transfer of social pathologies such as the drug trade and AIDS.

What Do Sociologists Do?

My perspective, to this point, is that development economists have little to gain from attempting to incorporate the social meta-theory reviewed to this point into development economics. The structural-functionalist research agenda was largely abandoned, wrongly in my judgment, by sociologists themselves. The dependency model, which proved so attractive to a number of younger sociologists in the 1960s and 1970s, was borrowed uncritically from economists and historians. And we still do not

have available to us an adequately articulated behavioral theory of social development.

Metatheory

The dominant trend in social research, since the 1950s has, however, not been a search for new meta-theory. Social research became increasingly policy oriented. It was designed to provide public and private policy makers and managers with the insight into social behavior that would be useful for program design and management in areas such as poverty alleviation, transfer of technology, organization of economic activity, consumer behavior, rural and urban development and others. New tools, particularly survey methods and statistical analyses have been widely adopted. These developments have been characterized by James S. Coleman as follows:

> The mainstream of social research has shifted from explaining the functioning of social systems to accounting for individual behavior. Properties of social systems have largely been regulated to the status of factors affecting individual behavior and are seldom the focus of investigation... Simultaneously with this shift in focus from the social system to the individual, the dominant mode of explanation in social research shifted away from one in which proposed action of individuals taken in combination and subject to various constraints, explained the functioning of social systems. This was replaced by a form of behaviorism, in which various factors external to the individuals consciousness are introduced to account for variations in individual behavior.
>
> (Coleman, 1986:1319)

Coleman is clearly unsympathetic to these developments. In his view statistical association between variables has largely replaced purposive explanations of the meaningful connections between events and action as the basic tool of description and analyses.

During the 1980s two alternative approaches have been proposed by social theorists for relating individual action to change in the performance or structure of social systems. Coleman has suggested an approach that attempts to reform sociology by building directly on the rational or purposive choice theory of action employed in economics (Coleman, 1986:1327-1332; Coleman, 1990). Amitai Etzioni has suggested an approach that attempts to reform economics by replacing the neoclassical assumption that the individual is the decision-making unit with the assumption that social groups are the prime decision-making unit (Etzioni, 1988).

This dichotomy, which Coleman characterized as representative of much American and European applied sociology, also applies to the subfield of development sociology. Mainstream sociologists, working outside of the dependency or world systems paradigm, have largely ceased to concern themselves with the more meta theoretical aspects of the sociology of development. It would be more appropriate to characterize their research as problem or issue oriented social research in developing societies. While sociological research in developing countries has often differed in terms of choice of problem from research by mainstream sociologists working in developed countries, it has differed little in terms of concept and method.

By the end of the 1980s, a number of sociologists were becoming increasingly concerned about the micro-macro problem or what economists refer to as the problem of aggregation. In sociology the issue can be cast in terms of understanding how one set of structures has been, or can be, transformed by the purposeful behavior of individual actors into another set of structures. It is precisely the answer to this question as noted earlier that development economists would like to be able to obtain from their colleagues in the field of sociology. But this relation of individuals

to the social order has remained "the central intractable problem for sociology" (Stinchcombe, 1975:27)[15].

Where does this conclusion leave me in the search for what development economists can, or should, learn from sociology? My response at this stage is to abandon the search for assistance from meta-theory in sociology. The next step in my agenda will be to review work in several areas of what Merton referred to as "middle range" theoretical and empirical research agendas that seem most relevant to issues in the field of development economics (Coser and Nisbet, 1975:10). These will include (a) the sociology of science and technology, (b) the sociology of production, and (c) the sociology of project design and implementation. All three are fields in which rural sociologists have made important contributions[16]. In this final section I briefly indicate why I have selected these three subfields for further revisions.

One is the sociological aspects of science and technology. Advances in science and technology are, to both sociologists and economists, a fundamental source of economic development. Research on the diffusion and adoption of technical innovations has been an important research tradition in sociology, anthropology, geography and economics (Brown, 1981; Rogers, 1983; Feder, Just and Zilberman, 1985:255-298). Beginning in the 1950s sociological research on diffusion and adoption of technology was regarded as a major contribution by sociologists, particularly rural sociologists, to advancing the modernization agenda.

During the 1970s, however, the diffusion-adoption research agenda came under increasing criticism on several grounds (Buttel, Larson and Gillespie, 1990:46-63; Busch, 1978:459-473). One was that it focused too narrowly on the social-psychological aspects of the diffusion process to the neglect of the political and economic contexts of adoption or rejection. A second was that the diffusion-adoption research agenda had adopted a promotional posture toward technical change and had avoided examining its socio-economic consequences.

By the late 1970s a new critical approach to the sociology of agricultural science and technology was rapidly displacing the diffusion research agenda among rural sociologists. This new agenda has focused on the political-economic sources and the social impact of technical change. A second body of research has focused on the process of social construction of knowledge in science and technology. It has given particular attention to external forces such as (a) scientific disciplines and disciplinary organizations; (b) the organizational context within which research workers are employed; and (c) the effects of pressures from external funding sources on bias in research (Busch and Lacy, 1983). One effect of this shift in the research agenda is that the policy focus has shifted from supporting the transfer of science and technology during the process of modernization to the protection of individuals and communities from the social disorganization resulting from technical change.

A second area is the "new economic sociology" that has emerged as a direct challenge to the economic understanding of production and market processes. The pioneering modern works in this tradition include the studies by Harrison White on labor mobility with organizations, the studies by Mark Granovetter of how people in labor markets obtain information, and the research by William H. Friedland and his associates on the organization of agricultural production (White, 1970; White and Eccles, 1987; Granovetter, 1985:481-510, Friedland, Barton and Thomas, 1981; Swedberg, 1990a:78-114).

The new economic sociology draws its intellectual inspiration both from the older tradition of industrial sociology, particularly in the division of labor within organizations, and from neo-Marxian analysis of labor process, including how differences in the organization of work generates different forms of stratification and consciousness rather than, as traditional Marxists has anticipated, greater working class homogeneity.

The potential significance of the new economic sociology for economic development is related to the rapid transition from a rural to an urban-industrial labor force. In the United States, and in other advanced industrial (or post-industrial) societies distance

agricultural economies and rural communities have largely ceased to exist (Bishop, 1967:999-1008; Friedland, 1982:589-608). Most developing economies are undergoing even more rapid transitions from a predominately rural to an urban-industrial labor force structure than the historical experience of the presently developed economies.

The third area is the sociology of development project design and implementation. During the last decade, it has become commonplace that development project performance has failed to meet expectations with unacceptable frequency - often because they were "sociologically ill-informed and ill-conceived" (Cernea, 1991: 12-15). By the mid-1980s implementation failures had largely discredited the integrated rural development and other poverty oriented program thrusts that had dominated development assistance policy, at least at the rhetorical level, from the early 1970s.

One result has been an increasing, if somewhat reluctant, sensitivity on the part of national and multilateral development assistance agencies to the importance of social organization for both project design and implementation. It has not been easy, however, for either the development assistance agencies or sociologists to design ways to effectively incorporate sociological research and design capacity to bear, within the project analysis, design, and implementation procedures employed by the assistance agencies to translate development assistance policy into action programs.

In part this difficulty also rests with the style of research that has been traditional within the discipline of sociology. In the past, much of sociological research on development projects has been conducted more in the spirit of social criticism than with the objective of contributing to design or implementation (Selznik, 1949). In part, this is because sociologists have been, and continue to be brought into the process only at the end of the project cycle process - at the evaluation stage. More recently, however, as sociologists have begun to colonize national and international development assistance bureaucracies at least some sociologists have learned how to complement their critical capacities with constructive approaches to design and implementation. The result has been the emergence of a small body of literature on the practice of sociology within development assistance organizations (Cernea, 1985; 1990).

As I complete the work in these three areas I will probably also find it useful to extend the review to cover some of the recent research on popular protest and social movements. At that time, it may also be useful to return to metatheory, particularly some of the more historically grounded research that has emerged during the late 1980's and early 1990's.

Notes:

1. In the Hayami and Ruttan work the term cultural endowements, is used to capture those dimensions of that have bern trasmited from the past. Contemporary changes in resource endowments, technology and institutions can be expected to result in changes in the cultural endowments available to future generations (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985:110-114).

2. Stiger and Becker(1977) note that the traditional view in economics is that tastes represent the unchallengeable axioms of man's behavior and that economic analysis "is abandoned at this point to whoever studies and explains tastes (psychologists?)

3. Our reluctant "economic imperialism" differs in spirit from the more aggressive economic imperialism of Gary Becker (1976). The term economic imperialism is used to describe the effort by economicsts to break down the traditional separation between economics and the other social sciences by applying the neoclassical approach to problems that have been the traditional concern of other social sciences (Swedberg, 1990b:141-154). See also the initial reactions to Becker's book by Duncan MacRae, Jr. (1977:1244-1258) and Darwin O. Sawyer, (1977:1259-1269).

4. Coleman's version of the function of sociology has been criticized as too narrow. William H. Sewell, Jr. argues that "sociological explanations of structural change must always be explainations of how one set of structures has been transformed by human action into another set of structures." (Sewell, 1987:170).

5. The "classical" source of modernization theory is the work of Max Weber. "Weber's basic Problemstellung was how to explain the specificity and uniqueness of European modernity. Why it was that only in the West—and not in other civilizations—the specific 'radical' tendency to a rationalization of the world developed and the major manifestations...could be found in all spheres of social life—in the emergence of capitalist civilization; then the bureaucratization of different forms of social life; the secularization of the world view; in the development of modern science and of the so-called scientific world view." (Eisenstadt, 1987:2).

6. Harrison notes that Parsons' views on social structure were strongly influenced by the writings of Bronislaw Malinowski based on his field research among the Trobriand Islands during World War I. Malinowski related the "basic needs of individual to the derived needs that have to be met for the continued survival of entire cultures and societies...Initially, there are the individual needs for food, drink, sleep, and sex. These are related to the needs of all members of society for safety, bodily comfort, and health. At a cultural level, there are derived needs for reproduction through kinship and health through the practice of hygiene" (Harrison, 1988:6). Smelser notes that the classic sources of functionalism, by Spencer and Durkheim, were drawn on to provide the dynamic of the diffferentiation-interaction component of the structural-functionalist model. (Smelser, 1963)

7. The structural-functionalism advanced by Parsons posited a link between the normative system and an environment of relatively stable and consistent constraints. "The normative system is presented as functional in a way that it solves the problems arising from (change in the) situation (or environment). Two problems result from this position. First, one is tempted to exaggerate the congruence between the structure (situation) and the 'function' or functional solution. Second, one is tempted to present the first as virtually the imprint of the second which reduces the congruence between the two to a tautology...Parsons gave up the term structural-functionalism...after 1960." (Boudon and Bourricaud, 1989:182-183) Because the normative system serves to maintain the structure, functionalism has been criticized as a conservative ideology. In my judgment the appropriate response to the two criticisms should have been the development and testing of formal sociometric models. The problems referred to by Boudon and Bourricaud is referred to as the "identification problem" in economics. It has also been a central concern in the construction and estimation of econometric models.

8. Some students take the position that Parsons had abandoned the structural functionalist paradigm by the early 1960s (Boudon and Bourricaud, 1989:183) I prefer, at this stage, to view the "evolutionary universals" as an attempt to make the structural functionalist model dynamic.

9. Parsons is even more explicit: "English common law, with its adoption and further development in the overseas English-speaking world, not only constituted the most advanced case of universalistic normative order, but was probably decisive for the modern world...I think it legitimate to regard the English type of legal system as a fundamental prerequisite of the first occurrence of the Industrial Revolution." (Parsons, 1964:353).

10. Etzioni expresses this point more aptly: "Ultimately, there is no way for a societal structure to discover the members' needs and adapt to them without the participation of the members in shaping and reshaping the structure." (Etzioni, 1968:626)

11. The point has been emphasized by Wilbert E. Moore: "Much of modern sociology has been built upon the conception of society as a system characterized by functional interdependency of major elements and relationships, and characterized by an orderly and persistent balance, a kind of equilibrium...Dysfunctional consequences of particular patterns of action were recognized and identified as potential sites of change" (Moore, 1964:888).

12. Horowitz, never one to avoid a rhetorical coup, is surprisingly critical of his colleagues in sociology for their reactions to modernization: "The disruption caused to societies around the world by technical and economic change has often called forth

Luddite responses from sociologists" (Horowitz, 1972:445). Wilbert E. Moore makes the same point with less rhetorical flourish: "...sociologists have tended toward cultural conservatism based on the supposed integrity of time honored values and customs." (Moore, 1964a:331-338).

13. "On the American scene, sociology and socialism have...long seen each other as enemies....Sociologists have so taken for granted the language of structure and function, stability, and pattern maintenance that socialism has come to be viewed as a form of deviance, a conflict-laden ideology devoid of the hard facts of social structure. Socialists, on their side, have for so long held out the need for radical social change that problems of order and structure have indeed come to be viewed as a sort of betrayal of radical principles. The sociologist is as "devian" from the socialists' 'standpoint as the socialist from the sociologists'. Any suggestion that the development of both socialism and sociology has been one-side, to the detriment of both, has produced bawls of protest from ideologists in both camps" (Horowitz, 1972:509).

14. Bender notes that Frank "has been treated by more sophisticated Marxist theorists like some sort of country bumpkin who has marched into the living room without removing his muddy galoshes" (Bender, 1986:3-33).

15. Stinchcombe notes also that "much of the beauty of economics comes from the easy translation between market equilibria and striving individuals" (Stinchcombe, 1975:27).

16. This may be due in part to the fact that rural sociologists, more than members of other subfields of sociology, have been involved in development research and program implementation. Friedland advances a somewhat more cynical explanation: "...In the 1930's rural sociologists moved away from agriculture and focused more attention on rural community life. As rural communities disappeared, many rural sociologists moved their intellectual interests aboard, becoming experts about rural communities in the Philippines, Bolivia and Pakistan rather than in the rural sections of New York, Wisconsin or California (Friedland, Borton and Thomas, 1981:2).

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■

RESUMEN

La Sociología del Desarrollo y del Subdesarrollo: ¿Tiene Lecciones para los Economistas?

Los economistas rara vez toman en cuenta a la sociología en sus análisis del proceso del desarrollo. En este artículo intento evaluar las contribuciones de los sociólogos que han trabajado dentro la tradición de la teoría de la modernización y de la dependencia, asi como, de la teoría del sistema mundial, en términos de sus potenciales contribuciones para los economistas que investigan el desarrollo. Concluyo que la metateoría sociológica tiene poco que ofrecer a los economistas en éste nivel, por lo que extendí mi revisión para cubrir un número de teorías de "alcance medio" que están más directamente vinculadas con la investigación aplicada por economistas del desarrollo.

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